Egypt has, historically and geopolitically, played a pivotal role when it came to the Palestinian cause. Situated on the border of southern Palestine, it controls the Rafah crossing into Gaza from Sinai. With Israel’s latest assault on Gaza, Cairo has once again emerged as a key player on the Middle East stage. Despite a growing divide between the Egyptian populace and the government, particularly in light of the country’s increasingly dire economic situation and the upcoming presidential elections, the regime appears to have recognized an opportunity to boost its popularity among the predominantly pro-Palestine Egyptian masses and potentially restore its regional influence. The Egyptian people and politics have historically had a steadfast and interlaced connection to the Palestinian cause, as highlighted by Nihal El Aasar in her analysis of the recent escalations.
Following the latest Israeli assault on Gaza, Egyptians were not only allowed but also encouraged to participate in demonstrations held on Friday, Oct. 20, by pro-government and state-aligned entities. This marked the first time in nearly a decade, and many analysts and observers concluded that it was an effort to enhance el-Sisi’s domestic and foreign image in preparation for the upcoming elections. Naturally, thousands took to the streets in hopes of portraying solidarity with Palestinians, while many also declared that their participation in those genuine demonstrations was not a sign of support for el-Sisi. It was not surprising, albeit deeply nostalgic and inspiring, that some protesters broke away from the state-designated demonstration areas and walked toward and into Tahrir Square — the iconic site for Egypt’s 2011 uprising — where they were swiftly dispersed. In the days following the protests of Oct. 20, over 100 people, out of those in both the state-sanctioned protests and the spontaneous demonstrations that erupted surrounding them, have reportedly been arrested by the Egyptian authorities. Since then, no further demonstrations have been organized, and any protests that have erupted were almost immediately dispersed.
The government’s attempts to stifle the Egyptian public’s solidarity in the streets might thus far be working. However, Egyptians continue to express their support in various ways, such as engaging with social media to raise awareness, participating in initiatives to collect donations and aid for Gaza, and attempting to call on government officials and state-sponsored media via social media and in small rallies. Some of these rallies have even seen people charging at the gates to the crossing Rafah crossing, urging its opening to allow aid from Egypt to enter Gaza and to facilitate the transfer of severely injured and sick individuals from Gaza into Egypt for medical treatment. Many are actively boycotting Western and Pro-Israel businesses and products as well, in line with BDS (Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions) guidelines.
The official Egyptian state position has been to demand that Israel allows for safe entry of aid into the Gaza Strip via the Rafah crossing, while also calling for an immediate humanitarian truce, and rejecting the transfer of Gazans into Sinai. These demands, and Egypt’s desire to play on regional and international influences in this conflict, were amplified when it organized the Cairo Peace Summit on Oct. 21 . The summit was co-chaired by Egyptian, Jordanian, and Palestinian leadership. Though it failed to produce any material resolution for the unceasing Gaza assault, it affirmed Egypt’s refusal of Israel’s forced displacement of Palestinians. The explicit Israeli, US-backed plan to push Palestinians out of Gaza and into Northern Sinai has only recently been confirmed via a document drafted by the Israeli Intelligence Ministry that was recently published. However, the plan has been evident since the events on Oct. 7 via various Israeli officials’ public statements and articles. One such statement was made by the former Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister in an interview with Marc Lamont Hill on Al-Jazeera, and an article referenced in a now-deleted Misgav Institute tweet.
Nevertheless, el-Sisi and the Egyptian government have rejected this plan on several grounds. Firstly, the rejection is based on Egypt’s refusal to allow Israel to “liquidate the Palestinian cause” by removing the Palestinians from their land, and into Sinai in a long and historical pattern of attempts to pacify Gaza using the same “solution.” Other grounds for Egypt’s refusal include national security considerations, as outlined in this article; among which are fears that, by opening the Rafah crossing, access to Hamas military operations in Sinai would also be opened, resulting in potential Israeli retaliation on Egyptian land. This notion is becoming increasingly plausible, even without the opening of the crossing, as demonstrated by the recent incident when two projectiles hit Taba and Nuweiba. Israeli officials later alleged that the projectiles were connected to the Houthis in Yemen. In any case, the events are seen by the Egyptian government as a threat to Egypt’s already waning stability. For the Egyptian people, though, solidarity with Palestine and their support for the Palestinians continues to grow; both exponentially and unconditionally.